Skill Detail

Verify shared and private fleet memory through Caura MCP

Use two provisioned agent identities to check fleet recall, private-memory boundaries and writer provenance before connecting a team to shared memory.

Security & VerificationMCP
Security & Verification MCP Security Reviewed
⭐ 559 GitHub stars
COPY SKILL INSTRUCTIONS (OPTIONAL)
npx skills add agentskillexchange/skills --skill verify-shared-and-private-fleet-memory-through-caura-mcp Copy
Uses the third-party skills CLI, not an ASE-owned installer. Check your agent’s compatibility. This copies instructions; complete the upstream tool setup below separately.
At a glance
Tools required
Two MCP Streamable HTTP clients, an existing Caura service with independent agent credentials, HTTP client for whoami, authorized test tenant and fleet
Install & setup
Use an existing managed or self-hosted Caura service that supports the required authenticated agent identities. Configure each MCP client with that service HTTPS /mcp URL and its separate protected X-API-Key or Bearer credential. Confirm identity through /api/v1/whoami before test writes. Upstream self-hosting instructions are at https://github.com/caura-ai/caura/blob/main/docs/self-hosting.md; do not use keyless standalone mode to validate identity isolation. No npm package is required for this MCP path.
Author
caura-ai
Publisher
Community
Last updated
Nov 14, 2026
Quick brief

Invoke before allowing multiple agents to rely on an existing Caura memory service. The operator supplies an authorized test tenant and fleet, two distinct provisioned agent identities, their separate credentials and unique non-sensitive test markers. The agent checks that a team-scoped fact can be recalled by a teammate and that a private fact does not appear in that teammate’s tested recall. Deliver a manifest of identities, scopes, memory IDs, queries and observed results.

How it works

What this skill actually does

Connect each MCP client to the same authorized Caura /mcp endpoint through Streamable HTTP, with its own protected X-API-Key or Bearer credential. On managed Caura, verify each identity with GET /api/v1/whoami and record its tenant, agent_id and trust information without logging keys. An operator provisions missing agent-scoped credentials; a shared tenant key plus a caller-supplied agent_id is not proof of independent authenticated identity. Self-hosted core-api does not provide the managed agent-key provisioning route. This identity-isolation check requires deployment support for independently authenticated agents.

Using the first identity, call caura_write with its actual agent_id, explicit fleet_id, visibility scope_team and a unique test fact. From the second identity, call caura_recall with its actual agent_id, fleet_ids containing that fleet and a query containing the unique marker. Check the returned memory ID and writer provenance. Write a different marker with visibility scope_agent. Confirm it is retrievable by the writer and absent from the teammate’s tested recall. Record transport errors, pending processing and ambiguous results rather than presenting an empty result as proof of access-control enforcement.

The boundary is a two-agent scope and provenance smoke test using documented MCP tools, not generic memory hosting, automatic trust elevation, organization-wide sharing or a security certification. Do not omit fleet_id: a fleet-less write can become tenant-shared. Standalone mode bypasses authentication and cannot establish the identity boundary tested here. A passing recall fixture does not prove exhaustive isolation, semantic retrieval quality or policy efficacy. The workflow is mapped to MCP because the approved invocation uses caura_write and caura_recall through MCP; the optional OpenClaw plugin and Rail SDK are outside scope. No runtime or security review has been performed by ASE.